Abstract-This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on some set of sensors and actuators in a control system. In such cases, it has been shown that a model aware adversary can carefully design attack vectors to bypass bad data detection and identification filters while causing damage to the control system. To counter such an attacker, we propose the moving target defense which introduces stochastic, time-varying parameters in the control system. The underlying random dynamics of the system limits an attacker's knowledge of the model and inhibits his or her ability to construct stealthy attack sequences. Moreover, the time-varying nature of the dynamics thwarts adaptive adversaries. We explore three main designs. First, we consider a hybrid system where parameters within the existing plant are switched among multiple modes. We demonstrate how such an approach can enable both the detection and identification of malicious nodes. Next, we investigate the addition of an extended system with dynamics that are coupled to the original plant but do not affect system performance. Here, an attack on the original system will affect the authenticating subsystem and in turn be revealed by a set of sensors measuring the extended plant. Lastly, we propose the use of sensor nonlinearities to enhance the effectiveness of the moving target defense. The nonlinear dynamics act to conceal normal operational behavior from an attacker who has tampered with the system state, further hindering an attacker's ability to glean information about the time-varying dynamics. In all cases mechanisms for analysis and design are proposed. Finally, we analyze attack detectability for each moving target defense by investigating expected lower bounds on the detection statistic. Our contributions are also tested via simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS), the amalgamation of sensing, processing, control, and communication in physical spaces, is an essential goal in today's society. CPS are ubiquitous in modern critical infrastructure such as transportation systems, energy delivery, health care, and sewage/water management. Consequently, these systems are attractive targets for adversaries and are essential to protect. Unfortunately, CPS are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [1] due to the large number of attack surfaces found in these large scale, heterogeneous, and highly connected systems. Additionally, existing defenses from cyber security alone are insufficient for protecting CPS. Techniques such as authenticated encryption, message authentication codes, and signatures that typically enable the detection of integrity attacks can be computationally P. Griffioen, S. Weerakkody, and B. Sinopoli are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15213. Email: pgriffi1@andrew.cmu.edu, sweerakk@andrew.cmu.edu, brunos@ece.cmu.edu complex and are ineffective against a class of attacks known as physical attacks. Moreover, updating legacy systems can prove to be impractical.
The vulnerabilities in CPS have culminated in several effective attacks from highly resourceful and knowledgeable attackers. In the year 2000, a malicious insider was able to utilize detailed system knowledge to attack a waste management system in Queensland, Australia [2] , resulting in the leakage of millions of liters of sewage. With Stuxnet [3] , a nation state adversary was able to compromise a uranium enrichment facility in Iran, leading to the destruction of a thousand centrifuges. More recently in 2015, hackers were able to remotely compromise a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system in Ukraine [4] , allowing them to cause widespread blackouts.
Motivated by the threat of such sophisticated attackers, we aim to design resilient CPS. As a first step we focus on the problem of detecting and in some cases isolating attacks from malicious attackers. The problem of recognizing attacks is not trivial, especially when considering highly knowledgeable and resourceful attackers. For instance adversaries can utilize model knowledge to engage in deceptive and powerful stealthy attacks, including false data injection attacks [5] , [6] , covert attacks [7] , zero dynamics attacks [8] , [9] , and replay attacks [10] . Here the adversary is able to leverage access to system channels and/or model knowledge to construct attacks which bypass traditional bad data detectors such that the outputs received by a SCADA operator are statistically consistent with expected output behavior.
To counter such an attacker, a defender must engage in active detection [11] by designing a system that adds additional redundancy or introduces a physical secret. For instance, physical watermarking was introduced in [10] to counter replay adversaries. Here, the defender changes his or her control input to introduce random authenticating perturbations to the system. Several extensions have been pursued, for instance [12] - [15] . Alternatively, the defender can pursue one time changes to the system, including changes to the parameters [16] or structural changes, for instance involving sensing and communication [17] . In addition, encryption or lower cost mechanisms such as coding [18] can be effective tools for authentication. Nonetheless, the above schemes can be rendered ineffective by strong attackers. Watermarking can fail against additive attacks pursued by model aware attackers. Increasing robustness through one time changes can fail against highly resourceful attackers. Finally sensor coding can be ineffective against attackers with physical access to sensors and a certain class of zero dynamics attacks.
To address these challenges, we consider the moving target defense, which was first introduced in [19] with extensions in [20] - [22] . Here, the defender introduces time-varying parameters into the control system, resulting in changes to the system matrices. The unknown parameters limit the attacker's understanding of the system model. Moreover, the timevarying dynamics ideally act as a moving target, changing fast enough to hinder a potential adaptive adversary from performing system identification.
The article considers three main moving target designs. In the first design, we evaluate a hybrid moving target where the system is switched among a number of discrete modes. We provide a set of design recommendations for the hybrid moving target which enable a defender to both detect and identify sensor attacks in control systems. Secondly, we design an extended moving target where we introduce an auxiliary system with time-varying dynamics coupled to the original plant. An attacker who targets the original system will also affect the additional dynamics due to this coupling. Moreover, the time-varying behavior of the system prevents the defender from concealing his or her attack through fake sensor measurements. We provide efficiently solvable optimization problems to design the parameters that generate the timevarying matrices in this extended moving target.
Finally, we note that even in the presence of time-varying dynamics, the attacker still has some opportunity to learn useful information about the model which can be applied to an attack. To limit this information, we introduce random nonlinearities in the sensor measurements which are amplified when the system state is perturbed and consequently conceal information about the system from the adversary when the plant is under attack. We provide a limit analysis to demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach as well as optimization problems to design the coefficient matrix associated with the nonlinearity. Lastly, we provide mechanisms to analyze attack detectability by investigating expected lower bounds on the detection statistic for each moving target defense.
The main contributions relative to our previous work in [19] , [21] , and [22] are as follows:
1) An extension of the work in [22] to account for a timevarying covariance that generates the distribution of the auxiliary actuators.
2) The introduction, analysis, and design of random nonlinearities in the sensor measurements that conceal information about the time-varying dynamics from the adversary when the plant is under attack.
3) The presentation and validation of a simpler and more accurate method for computing expected lower bounds on the detection statistic. The rest of the article is summarized below. In section II, we introduce the system and attack models along with the moving target defense. In section III, we consider the design of a hybrid moving target defense, placing a special focus on attack identification. Next, in section IV, we investigate the design of an extended moving target defense for attack detection. Later, in section V, we pursue the design of a nonlinear moving target defense to limit an attacker's ability to identify the system model. In section VI, we propose statistical bounds to analyze the performance of the moving target defense. Lastly, section VII includes simulation results and section VIII concludes the article.
II. MODELING THE MOVING TARGET A. System Model
To begin, we introduce the model for the system under consideration. We model our CPS as a linear time-invariant system as follows
Here x k ∈ R n represents the system state at time k, u k ∈ R p is a vector of control inputs and y k ∈ R m represents a collection of m scalar sensor outputs. In addition, to capture uncertainty we consider independent and indentically distributed (IID) Gaussian process noise w k ∼ N (0, Q) and IID Gaussian sensor noise v k ∼ N (0, R). We assume that (A, B) and (A, Q 1 2 ) are stabilizable, (A, C) is detectable, and R ≻ 0. In this article, we consider an adversary who can perform integrity attacks. Here, an attacker is able to corrupt some subset of inputs and outputs. This for instance can be done over a network through a man in the middle attack where an attacker intercepts true packets and replaces them with false packets. Alternatively, physical attacks can disrupt the integrity of a system. For instance, the attacker can change the settings of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or the environment surrounding system sensors. Mathematically, we model an integrity attack as follows
Without loss of generality, an attack is assumed to begin at time k = 0. Here, B a u a k represents attacks on the control inputs and D a d a k represents attacks on sensor outputs. If all actuators can be corrupted, B a = B and if all sensors can be modified D a = I. Motivated by the resources of malicious insiders and nation state adversaries, we will in many cases consider this worst case scenario. Additionally, we will also consider the possibility that an attacker has detailed system knowledge. A fundamental understanding of the plant when combined with significant disruption resources can lead to powerful attacks [9] . For instance, an attacker can attempt to subtract his or her influence. Here an adversary chooses an arbitrary sequence of control inputs {u a k } in order to drive the system along the controllable subspace (A, B a ). To avoid detection, the attacker leverages model knowledge to construct stealthy outputs. Specifically,
It can be shown that the probability distribution of the outputs under such an attack is identical to the distribution under normal operation. Consequently no standard bad data detector can recognize this adversarial behavior, and as a result this behavior is perfectly stealthy. We remark that a significant resource for an attacker here is model knowledge, which allows the adversary to carefully construct fake sensor outputs.
In the ensuing subsections we propose three main designs which allow us to limit an attacker's knowledge of the system model. We call this collection of tools the moving target defense.
B. Hybrid Moving Target Defense
In the hybrid moving target we change parameters of the system, particularly the system matrices, in a time-varying fashion to limit the adversary's knowledge of the system model. The time-varying sequence of system matrices is known to the defender but kept hidden from the adversary, which limits the effectiveness of an adaptive attacker. The dynamics of the hybrid moving target are given below
We assume that our plant is a switching hybrid system. Here, (A k , B k , C k ) belong to a finite set of modes Γ = {(A(1), B(1), C(1)), · · · , (A(l), B(l), C(l))}. While Γ may be known to an attacker, the exact realization of system matrices will be unknown. This forces an attacker to leverage imperfect system information when constructing an attack, which in turn can reveal his or her malicious behavior. In section III, we will investigate the applications of the hybrid moving target defense for the purposes of identifying sensor attacks in control systems, specifically considering how to design Γ and the sequence of time-varying matrices. We note that introducing parameter changes to the system can result in tradeoffs between security and control performance. This issue is addressed in the next section when we consider the extended moving target defense.
C. Extended Moving Target Defense
In the extended moving target, an authenticating subsystem is added on top of the nominal control system. Specifically, we introduce additional statesx k ∈ Rñ measured by additional sensorsỹ k ∈ Rm, which have dynamics that are coupled to the dynamics of the original state x k . The dynamics of the extended moving target are given below
with process noisew k ∼ N (0, Q) and sensor noisev k ∼ N (0, R) such that Q BlkDiag(Q, Q) 0 and R RR 12 ;R T 12 R ≻ 0. We assume that the time-varying matricesĀ k ,B k , andC k are selected from an IID distribution (to be designed later in this article). Without loss of generality, the control inputs are multiplexed to the actuators of both the nominal and extended systems. The extended moving target is designed so that if an adversary attempts to bias the original state x k , he or she also modifies the auxiliary statex k . This in turn will cause changes to the measurementsỹ k . Ideally an attacker who can modifyỹ k will be unable to do so in a convincing manner due to his or her lack of knowledge about the time-varying dynamics. The time-varying behavior will also impede the task of system identification.
Remark 2. While this system involves matricesĀ k ,B k , and C k selected from an IID distribution, the extended moving target defense can still be effective in other scenarios. For instance, the system parameters can evolve at multiple time scales. In this case, the longer the target remains in place, the easier it is for the adversary to identify the system. A significant advantage of the extended moving target defense relative to the hybrid moving target defense is potential system performance. In particular, if we do not care about controlling the additional statesx k , the controller of the original system can remain unchanged and no online performance is sacrificed. Because the dynamics of the original plant remain in place, there is no tradeoff between security and control. We will consider the design of the parameters that generate the system matrices in the extended moving target for attack detection in section IV. 
D. Nonlinear Moving Target Defense
The utility of the moving target lies in the challenges it poses for an adversary aiming to perform system identification. However, we acknowledge that the sensor measurements as constructed do reveal some information about the system dynamics. In order to further limit the information available to an attacker, we can intentionally introduce nonlinearities. Many systems are inherently nonlinear, allowing us to leverage the dynamics of the system to introduce these nonlinearities. Notably, consider the sensor measurements for the nonlinear moving target below
It is assumed that the extended state dynamics are unchanged (5) . However, a nonlinearity G k f (x k ) is introduced into the auxiliary sensor measurements where G k is a random matrix chosen from an IID distribution. Here the nonlinearity takes a form such that G k determines the direction of the nonlinearity and f (x k ) determines the magnitude of the nonlinearity. The nonlinearity is designed so that it is approximately 0 when the system state lies within a normal region of operation. When the state has been perturbed away from its normal region of operation, the nonlinearity becomes large and unpredictable. An attacker who aims to remain stealthy must be able to produce counterfeit measurements which do not contain this large nonlinearity. Nonetheless, this is impractical because the attacker does not know the time-varying matrix G k which determines the nonlinearity. Moreover, the large highly nonlinear attack measurements will significantly impede an attacker's ability to learn the time-varying matrices (Ā k ,B k ,C k ) from the measurementsỹ k . The design of matrix G k and an analysis of the nonlinear moving target is presented in section V.
E. Estimation and Detection
A Kalman filter can be used to compute the minimum mean squared error state estimatex k|k given the set of previous measurements up toȳ k . The Kalman filter is a linear estimator given byx
wherex k+1|k is the a priori state estimate,x k|k is the a posteriori state estimate, P k+1|k is the a priori error covariance matrix, and K k is the Kalman gain. To detect attacks on the CPS, a residue-based detector that leverages the a priori state estimatex k|k−1 is utilized. The residuez k represents the difference between the observed and expected value of the measurements and is given bȳ
By incorporating this residue, a χ 2 detector given by
follows a χ 2 distribution under normal operation. The χ 2 detector, which has T (m +m) degrees of freedom, attempts to exploit this fact by testing to see if the residues follow the correct distribution. Here η k represents the threshold of the bad data detector, H 0 is the null hypothesis which represents normal system operation, H 1 is the alternative hypothesis which denotes that the system is under attack, and T represents the detector window that considers past measurements. Measurements that are in close agreement with expected values generate small detection statistics and thus raise no alarm. Large deviations between measured and expected behavior will lead to a large χ 2 statistic, thus causing an alarm.
Remark 4. Estimation and detection for the hybrid moving target is described by replacingx
, Q, and R, respectively.
While the estimation and detection techniques described above can be applied to the hybrid moving target and the extended moving target, a slight modification must occur when performing estimation and detection for the nonlinear moving target. Because the sensor measurements are nonlinear, an extended Kalman filter is used and is given bŷ
The residue is thenz k =ȳ k − C kxk|k−1 − G k f (x k|k−1 ); 0 , and the detector is the same as the χ 2 detector in (13) except that C i is replaced by Φ i .
III. HYBRID MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
We first consider the hybrid moving target defense, where we perform active detection by changing the parameters of the plant itself in a discrete fashion. This technique will aid not only in the detection of malicious adversaries but will also prevent unidentifiable attacks by limiting the adversary's knowledge of the system. To begin we define the following, where y s k represents the sth entry of y k .
Definition 1. A nonzero attack on sensor s is unambiguously identifiable at time t if there is no
An attack on sensor s is unambiguously identifiable if it is unambiguously identifiable for all t.
The notion of unambiguous identifiability characterizes when the defender can be certain that sensor s is faulty or under attack. This scenario occurs only if there exists no initial state which produces the output sequence at y s . We seek to design a system that forces the attacker to generate unambiguously identifiable attacks on all targeted sensors, allowing the defender to identify these misbehaving sensors.
We consider the hybrid moving target dynamics as given in (4) from the adversary's perspective, where the adversary performs an attack on an ordered set of sensors
Without loss of generality, we assume that an attack starts at time k = 0. Here, D a ∈ R m×|K| is defined as D a uv (K) = I u=si ,v=i where I is the indicator function and (u, v) are the indices of an element of D a . Implicitly, we assume that the set of sensors which the adversary targets is constant due to (ideally) the inherent difficulty of hijacking sensors. In an integrity attack, the adversary seeks to adversely affect the physical system by preventing proper feedback.
Consequently, it is important for the defender to identify trusted sensor nodes. Estimation and control algorithms can then be tuned to ignore attacked nodes. We assume that the defender knows the system dynamics A k , B k , C k as well as the input and output histories given by u 0:k−1 and y 0:k but is unaware of the set K and the initial state x 0 . Hence the problem of identifying malicious nodes is independent of the control input, allowing us to disregard the control input. In the deterministic case, the dynamics are then given by 
Proof. The proof is given in [21] .
Changing the system matrices as a function of time allows the system to act like a moving target. Even if an attacker is aware of the existing configurations Γ of the system, he or she will likely be forced to generate unambiguously identifiable attacks since he or she is not aware of the sequence of system matrices.
A. System Design for Deterministic Identification
We now consider criteria that can allow a defender to design an effective set Γ. We assume that the adversary knows Γ, the sequence of attack inputs D a d a 0:k , and the probability distribution of the sequence of system matrices A k and C k but does not know the input sequence u 0:k−1 or the output sequence y 0:k . Given this knowledge, an adversary can guess the sequence of system matrices and if correct can generate attacks that are not unambiguously identifiable.
We would like to consider systems where A k and C k remain constant for multiple time steps due to the system's inertia. For now, we assume the pair (A k , C k ) ⊂ {Γ} is constant. An adversary can use his or her knowledge of Γ to guess a pair (A k , C k ) ∈ Γ and generate unidentifiable attack inputs. We next determine when an attacker is able to guess an incorrect pair and avoid generating an unambiguously identifiable attack. where
be a maximal set of linearly independent (generalized) eigenvectors associated with eigenvalue λ Proof. The proof is given in [23] .
There exists an attack on sensor s which is not unambiguously identifiable for all time if and only if there exists λ
Roughly speaking, given enough observations, the output at sensor s for a time-invariant system will be dominated by the observable mode(s) that have the largest eigenvalue. Thus, if the eigenvalues between two system matrices are distinct, we are able to distinguish the resulting outputs. Theorem 2 gives the defender an efficient way to determine if an attacker can guess Γ incorrectly and still remain unidentified when the system matrices are kept constant for at least 2n time steps. It also prescribes a means to perform perfect identification.
Design Recommendations 1) For all pairs
2) The system matrices (A k , C k ) are periodically changed after every N ≥ 2n time steps. 3) Let {l k } be a sequence where
Corollary 1. Assume a defender follows the design recommendations. Suppose sensor s is attacked and there is no
Then the sensor attack will be unambiguously identifiable with probability 1.
As a result, an attacker who persistently biases a sensor will be perfectly identified. Note that recommendation 3 can be achieved with an IID assumption or an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. The last 2 recommendations are not needed for this result but are justified in the next subsection when we consider stochastic systems. 
B. False Data Injection Detection
We now examine the effectiveness of the hybrid moving target defense for detection in the case of a stochastic system where the dynamics are given by
The information and goals of the adversary and the defender remain unchanged except that both the adversary and the defender are aware of the noise statistics and the defender knows the distribution of the initial state f (x 0 ) = N (x 0|−1 , P 0|−1 ). To characterize detection performance, we consider the additive bias ∆z k the adversary injects on the normalized residues due to his or her sensor attacks. The residue z k is the normalized difference between the observed measurement and its expected value, which is slightly different than the unnormalized residue defined in section II that is used throughout the rest of the article. The bias ∆e k on the a posteriori state estimation error and the bias ∆z k on the normalized residues are given by
with ∆e −1 = 0. A residue detector such as the χ 2 detector will recognize large residues and mark them as belonging to an attack. We now show that an adversary is restricted in the bias he or she can inject on the state estimation error without significantly biasing the residues and incurring detection.
Theorem 3. Suppose a defender uses a hybrid moving target defense leveraging the design recommendations listed above.
Then lim sup k→∞ ∆e k = ∞ =⇒ lim sup k→∞ ∆z k = ∞ with probability 1.
Thus the attacker is able to destabilize the estimation error only by destabilizing the residues. As such, there is a point where an attacker is unable to introduce additional bias to the estimation error without revealing his or her presence due to his or her effect on the measurement residues.
C. Resilient Estimation and Identification
While the hybrid moving target defense guarantees we can detect unbounded false data injection attacks, we wish to also identify specific malicious sensors as in the deterministic case. To do so, we present a resilient estimator that fuses state estimates generated by individual sensors since previous results [24] , [25] suggest such an estimator has better fault tolerance. This is desirable since we are attempting to force a normally stealthy adversary to generate faults. We will show that an attacker can destabilize this estimator only if the culprit sensors can be identified. In particular, we will show that the estimation error will become unbounded only if the bias on a sensor residue is also unbounded.
To begin, we assume that for each sensor s, 
where each pair (A k,s , C k,s ) is observable and belongs to Γ s . A Kalman filter with bounded covariance (see proof of Theorem 3) can be constructed to estimate ζ k,s given y s 0:k . From the definition of the Kalman filter, we havê (29) whereζ k|k−1,s andζ k|k,s are the a priori and a posteriori state estimates of ζ k,s , P 
], R i,j is the (i, j) entry of R, and z k,s is the normalized residue. Note that (27) and (28) hold for s 1 = s 2 .
We would like to use the individual state estimatesζ k|k,s associated with each sensor s to obtain an overall state estimate of x k . To do this, first define
where η k,s is an IID sequence of Gaussian random variables with η k,s ∼ N (0, ǫI) for some small ǫ > 0. Moreover {η k,s1 } and {η k,s2 } are independent sequences. η k,s is a mathematical artifact introduced so the subsequent estimator has a simplified closed form and can be easily removed or mitigated by letting ǫ tend to 0. From here we obtainŷ
It can be seen that η k is normally distributed so that η k ∼ N (0, Υ), where Υ ≻ 0 consists of m×m blocks with the (i, j) block given by
Here δ ij is the Kronecker delta. The minimum variance unbiased estimate (MVUB) [26] of x k givenŷ k is given bŷ
The last n entries ofx k , denoted asx * k , constitute an MVUB estimate of x k given the set of sensor estimatesŷ k . We next show that the proposed estimator of x k has bounded covariance.
Theorem 4. Consider the estimator of x k defined by eqs. (24) to (30) . The estimator has bounded covariance.
We lastly demonstrate that the proposed estimator is sensitive to biases ∆z k,s in individual residues, specifically showing that an infinite bias introduced into the estimator implies that the residues are also infinite. Defining e * k x k −x * k and letting ∆e * k represent the bias on e * k due to the adversary's inputs, we have the following result.
Theorem 5. Consider the estimator of x k defined by eqs. (24) to (30) . Then, with probability 1, lim sup k→∞ ∆e * k
While the proposed estimator does not guarantee each malicious sensor will be identified, it does guarantee that the defender will be able to identify and remove sensors whose attacks cause unbounded bias in the estimation error simply by analyzing each sensor's measurements individually. This is due to the fact that the bias on the residues of such sensors will grow unbounded, which can be easily detected by a χ 2 detector. As a result, we propose the following detector to identify malicious behavior for each individual sensor s
Here τ i k represents the threshold of the detector, i ∈ {1, · · · , m}, and H s 1 and H s 0 are the hypotheses that sensor s is malfunctioning or is working normally, respectively. A sensor s which repeatedly fails detection can be removed from consideration when obtaining a state estimate and the proposed fusion based estimation scheme can be adjusted accordingly.
IV. EXTENDED MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
Instead of varying the system matrices directly, the extended moving target defense introduces an auxiliary system whose sensor measurements reveal any biases an adversary exerts on the nominal control system. As such, we seek to design the auxiliary system in such a way as to maximize the probability of detection when the system is under attack. Specifically, we would like to design the parameters that generateĀ k ,B k , andC k to maximize detection performance. Because a joint maximization overĀ k ,B k , andC k becomes infeasible for A k andC k , we recognize that detection performance is a direct function of accurate state estimation. Consequently, we design the parameters that generateĀ k andC k to maximize estimation performance while designing the parameters that generateB k to maximize detection performance. We consider a general set of additive integrity attacks as modeled in (2) for the nominal system where B a = B (all actuators can be corrupted) and D a = I (all sensors can be modified). An adversary with these capabilities and knowledge of the nominal system dynamics can arbitrarily and stealthily perturb the nominal system using a covert attack [7] . This set of additive integrity attacks can be written as
Here the auxiliary actuatorsB k and coupling matricesĀ k andC k are generated from the following distributions:
∀i with independence between rows over time. We consider a strong adversary who is able to read and modify all of the inputs and outputs so that the design of the parameters generatingĀ k ,B k , andC k is optimal for even the strongest additive integrity attacks. Given this attack model, we now describe how to design the covariances ΣB k , ΣĀ, and ΣC of the distributions associated with the auxiliary actuators and the coupling matrices to maximize detection and estimation performance, respectively.
A. Auxiliary Actuators Design
To design the covariance ΣB k to maximize detection performance, we use the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence as a metric for detection performance that, roughly speaking, quantifies the distance between the distribution of the residue under attack and the distribution of the residue under normal operation. We note that any additive integrity attack will result in an additive bias on the residue which can be written as a linear combination of the control input biases u a j:k−1 and sensor measurement biasess a j+1:k exerted by the attacker. Here j denotes the time when the attacker first exerts a bias on the control inputs and j + 1 represents the time when the attacker first attempts to hide his or her attack by exerting a bias on the sensor measurements. As shown in [22] , the bias on the residue ∆z i can be written as
where θ j:k represents a vector containing all of the attacker's biases and M x (j,i) and M y (j,i) are given by
with D (j,i)
. Under normal operation, it can be shown that the residue follows a normal distribution f 0 (z i ) = N (0, Σ i ) with zero mean and covariance Σ i
If the defender has no prior information about the attacker's biases θ j:k , the residue under attack will also follow a normal distribution f 1 (z i ) = N (M (j,i) θ j:k , Σ i ) with a mean equal to the bias on the residue. Because the covariance of f 0 and f 1 are the same, the KL divergence is symmetric and can be written as
where the second equality follows from the fact that the residue has zero mean under normal operation.
Maximizing the KL divergence becomes difficult because the attacker biases θ j:k are unknown to the defender. However, we note that M
is positive semidefinite, allowing us to maximize the expected value of the KL divergence for all possible additive integrity attacks. This is carried out by maximizing a nonnegative constant ǫ such that the expected value of the KL divergence is greater than a positive semidefinite lower bound N (ǫ) that is a function of ǫ. Since there are real-world constraints on the variance magnitude of the auxiliary actuators, we constrain the covariance ΣB k with a positive semidefinite upper bound N B . This maximization problem is presented below
As shown in [22] , we can construct the positive semidefinite lower bound N (ǫ) to match the block structure of
The off-diagonal blocks of this structure are not functions of ΣB k , allowing the constraint in (37) to be simplified to the following series of constraints
Here N t 0 and Ψ tt (j,i) is shown in [22] to be
where
and Sum(A) represents the sum of all the elements of A.
Combining (38) and (39) allows the second constraint in (37) to be written as a set of positive semidefinite constraints. We choose j = k − T so that the KL divergence is maximized over the time window T of the chi-squared detector. This allows the optimization problem in (37) to be written as
which is a semidefinite program with t = 0, · · · , T − 1 and unique solutions for ǫ and ΣB k . As a result, this optimization problem provides a method for designing ΣB k so that the expected value of the KL divergence is maximized for the set of all possible additive integrity attacks described by (32) .
B. Coupling Matrices Design
We now focus our attention on the design of the covariances ΣĀ and ΣC that generate the coupling matricesĀ k and C k . To maximize estimation performance, we seek to design ΣĀ and ΣC to maximize the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states x A k through the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ a k . Accurate estimation of the attacked state will enable a system operator to better distinguish between true and falsified measurements. Since the accuracy of the state estimate depends on the amount of information the sensor measurements carry about the state, maximizing this amount of information should increase detection performance.
Remark 8. If the system is operating normally, this design will maximize the amount of information the system operator receives about the unaltered states x k . Consequently, this design will increase estimation performance regardless of whether or not the system is under attack.
We consider the amount of information all the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ 
To quantify the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states through the biased auxiliary sensor measurements, we use the Fisher information matrix I. The Fisher information matrix is a metric that quantifies the amount of information a set of measurements contains about a set of unknown parameters. As seen in [22] , the Fisher information matrix is shown to be
wherex 0 ∼ N (0,P 0|−1 ), ΣQ BlkDiag(P 0|−1 ,Q, · · · ,Q), and ΣR BlkDiag(R, · · · ,R).
We note that I is positive semidefinite, allowing us to maximize the expected value of the Fisher information matrix for all possible additive integrity attacks. This is carried out by maximizing a nonnegative constant γ such that the expected value of the Fisher information matrix is greater than a positive semidefinite lower bound G(γ) that is a function of γ. Since there are real-world constraints on the variance magnitude of the state coupling and auxiliary sensors, we constrain the covariances ΣĀ and ΣC with positive semidefinite upper bounds G A and G C , respectively. This maximization problem is presented below
As shown in [22] , we can construct the positive semidefinite lower bound G(γ) to match the block structure of I. The offdiagonal blocks of this structure are not functions of ΣĀ or ΣC , allowing the constraint in (43) to be simplified to the following series of constraints
−1 , respectively. Utilizing (44) and the results above allows the third constraint in (43) to be written as a series of positive semidefinite constraints. We choose k = T − 1 so that the Fisher information matrix is maximized over the time window T of the chi-squared detector. This allows the optimization problem in (43) to be written as arg max γ,ΣĀ ,ΣC γ s.t. ΣĀ GA, ΣC GC ,
which is a semidefinite program with i = 0, · · · , T − 1 and unique solutions for γ, ΣĀ, and ΣC . As a result, this optimization problem provides a method for designing ΣĀ and ΣC so that the expected value of the Fisher information matrix is maximized for the set of all possible additive integrity attacks described by (32).
V. NONLINEAR MOVING TARGET DEFENSE
While the parameters that generate the time-varying dynamics of the extended moving target are designed to maximize detection and estimation performance, it is still possible for an intelligent adversary to perform some system identification. This is due to the fact that the auxiliary sensor measurements contain some information about the time-varying matricesĀ k , B k , andC k . As a result, we seek to leverage the nonlinearity G k f (x k ) in the nonlinear moving target to minimize the amount of information an adversary may receive about the time-varying matricesĀ k ,B k , andC k . The auxiliary sensors in this system measure a nonlinear function of the state, where the nonlinear function f (x k ) is an element-wise mapping from R n → R n and G k ∈ Rm ×n is generated from the distribution G k (column i) ∼ N (µ G , Σ G ) ∀i with independence between columns over time.
A. Limiting System Identification
We again consider a general set of integrity attacks as modeled in (32) for the nonlinear moving target defense. From the perspective of the attacker, this can be written as
whereỹ A k represents the sensor measurements that the attacker intercepts. Given these dynamics, the auxiliary intercepted sensor measurements are given bỹ
Considering the amount of information all the auxiliary intercepted sensor measurementsỹ 
T T , and
and the matrices are given by
, and 
To quantify the amount of information the strong adversary receives about the time-varying parameters θ 0:k from the auxiliary intercepted sensor measurementsỹ 
, and the partial derivatives of the mean µỹA 0:k |θ 0:k and the covariance ΣỹA 0:k |θ 0:k equal 0 and H(column i), respectively, with H H X H U H E . Applying these results to each element of the Fisher information matrix implies that I N L can be written as
To understand how the nonlinear term G k f (x A k ) influences the Fisher information matrix, we consider the dynamics given in (46) and (47) without the nonlinear term G k f (x A k ) and see that the Fisher information matrix I L can be written as
Given these representations of I N L and I L in (53) and (54), we can use the Woodbury identity to show that the difference between the Fisher information matrices associated with the systems containing and not containing the nonlinearity is positive definite as seen below This general analysis provides intuition about the effects of the magnitude of the nonlinearity on the information received by the adversary. Because the function f (x k ) determines the magnitude of the nonlinearity while the coefficient matrix G k determines the direction of the nonlinearity, in Section VII we design the function f (x k ) to limit the adversary's information while in the next subsection we design the coefficient matrix G k to maximize the defender's estimation performance.
B. Nonlinearity Design
We now consider the same additive integrity attacks on the nonlinear moving target as described in (46) and (47) from the perspective of the defender. We wish to provide joint guidelines for designing the parameters of the distributions that generate the time-varying matricesĀ k ,C k , and G k . Here we do not design the parameters that generateB k because the extended moving target design of ΣB k should be sufficient to maximize detection performance as long as the magnitude of the nonlinear function f is approximately zero when the state lies within a normal region of operation. In providing a joint design for the time-varying matricesĀ k ,C k , and G k , we seek to design ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G to maximize the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states to improve the defender's estimation performance, in turn improving detection performance. The state dynamics are the same as those given in (46), while the sensor measurements are given by
whereȳ a k represents the biased sensor measurements that the defender receives. Given these dynamics, the biased auxiliary sensor measurements are given bỹ
Considering the amount of information all the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ where
T T . With this representation, we see that the distribution of all the biased auxiliary sensor measurements given all the attacked states follows a normal distributioñ y 
where the partial derivative of the covariance Σỹa Applying these results to each element of the Fisher information matrix implies that I can be written as
To maximize the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states, we wish to maximize the expected value of the Fisher information matrix which takes the following form
where Ω A , Ω C , and Ω AC are defined as given in (44) and
We note that the first term in (64) contains ΣĀ and ΣC while the second term only contains Σ G . Furthermore, the first term in (64) is simply the expected value of the Fisher information matrix given in (42). Consequently, we can maximize the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states by jointly designing ΣĀ and ΣC as given in (45) while designing Σ G to maximize the second term in (64). 
Since H G is a diagonal matrix, the second constraint in (65) can be simplified to the following series of constraints
Noting that
is maximized over the time window T of the chi-squared detector, the optimization problem in (65) can be written as
with i = 0, · · · , T − 1 and unique solutions for δ and Σ G . Consequently, this optimization problem provides a method for designing Σ G to maximize the expected value of the Fisher information matrix for all possible additive integrity attacks described by (46) and (56).
VI. BOUNDS ON ATTACKER'S PERFORMANCE
We now turn our attention to calculating lower bounds on the detection statistic associated with optimal attacks on each of the moving target systems. These bounds characterize the worst case detection performance while under attack. We first investigate lower bounds on the attacker's state estimation and use these bounds to understand how well an adversary can fool the bad data detector.
A. Attack Strategy
We consider an attack strategy where the adversary aims to track the system operator's state estimatex k|k−1 . By tracking the system operator's state estimate, the adversary attempts to generate stealthy outputs. We assume the adversary has full knowledge of the nominal static system model, is able to read and modify all the control inputs and all the sensor outputs, and knows the probability density function (pdf) of the random matrices and the noise. Without loss of generality, we assume that the attack begins at k = 0. For the hybrid moving target, the attacker's observations and strategy are formulated as
For the extended moving target, the attack strategy is the same as (68) and (69) 
Here I A k refers to the information available to the attacker which for the hybrid moving target, extended moving target, and nonlinear moving target are respectively These attack strategies are motivated by the following result which states that for the extended moving target, the chosen sensor measurement biass a k minimizes the expected value of the χ 2 detection statistic. This illustrates the potential effectiveness of the attack when countered by a χ 2 detector. This result can easily be extended to account for the sensor biases and the measurement residues of the hybrid moving target and the nonlinear moving target. 
Theorem 6. Consider a strong adversary who knows
Solving gives
and the result holds.
B. Bounds on Attacker's State Estimation
Given the attack strategies considered in the last section, we now wish to characterize a lower bound Z k on the mean square error matrix of the attacker's estimate ofx k|k−1 . Sincê x e k|k−1 represents the attacker's estimate ofx k|k−1 , this lower bound Z k is given by
To approximate Z k , we leverage conditional posterior CramerRao lower bounds for Bayesian sequences. Unlike the traditional Cramer-Rao lower bound which is limited to unbiased estimators, the Bayesian Cramer-Rao lower bound considers both biased and unbiased estimators. Here we propose using the direct conditional posterior Cramer-Rao lower bound as set forth in [28] to approximate Z k . The authors here make use of the Bayesian Cramer-Rao lower bound or Van Trees bound derived in [29] which states that the mean squared error matrix is bounded by the inverse of the Fisher information matrix I k as follows
where x To compute I k+1 , a particle filter is used to represent the distribution of x k+1 with the weighted particles {x
. As shown in [28] , I D k+1 can be computed using the following approximation
k+1 is the standard Fisher information matrix with element (m, n) given by
where p(ȳ
. Using a simple Gaussian approximation for the prediction distribution p(x k+1 |ȳ
I P k+1 can be approximated by the inverse of the covariance matrix as demonstrated in [28] so that I
k . By choosing the importance density of the particle filter to be the prior p(x k+1 |x (j) k ), the weight update equation derived in [30] simplifies to w
A sequential importance sampling algorithm such as that presented in [30] can be used to implement the particle filter, and resampling can be introduced to keep the particle filter from degenerating. Other algorithms presented in [30] such as the auxiliary sampling importance resampling filter and the regularized particle filter can be used to protect the particle filter from sample impoverishment, which is severe in the case of small process noise.
Remark 9. Computing a lower bound for the hybrid moving target is described by replacingx
, and z k , respectively.
C. Bounds on Detection
The algorithm described above provides a method for computing an approximate lower bound on the mean square error matrix of the attacker's estimate ofx k|k−1 for a given set of inputs u 0:k , u 
Proof. We have the following.
The first three equalities follow from Theorem 6 and the properties of the trace and expectation. The final inequality follows from (76). 
VII. SIMULATION
We validate each moving target design by considering the quadruple tank process [31] , a multivariable laboratory process that consists of four interconnected water tanks. The goal is to control the water level of the first two tanks using two pumps. The system has four states (water level for each tank), two inputs (voltages applied to the pumps), and two outputs (voltages from level measurement devices for the first two tanks). We use an LQG controller with weights following suggestions in [32] . To ensure an appropriate noise magnitude, Q,Q, R, and R are created by generating a matrix from a uniform distribution, multiplying it by its transpose, and dividing by 100. A window size of 10 is used for the χ 2 detector,Ã andC are composed of 50% nonzero entries pulled from a standard normal distribution, andÃ is stable. The extended system is comprised of 4 auxiliary states and 2 auxiliary sensors, and experiments are averaged over 1000 trials. Simulation results for the hybrid moving target defense can be found in [23] .
A. Extended Moving Target Defense
For the extended moving target, we seek to design a timeinvariant covariance ΣB for the auxiliary actuators of the quadruple tank process. This will enable a defender with computational limitations to not run the optimization problem in (40) at every time step. Consequently, we use the means ofĀ k andC k in designing a time-invariant ΣB. Furthermore,
in the dynamics of the system to highlight the difference between optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣB on detection performance.
We consider an adversary who starting at time 200 sec. adds a constant input of 0.04 volts to the optimal LQG input and avoids detection by trying to subtract his or her own influence from the sensor measurements as described in (3) . We assume that the attacker does not know the realization of B k but performs his or her attack by sampling the matrix from B k (row i) ∼ N (µB, ΣB) where we have chosen µB = 0. We plot the absolute mean tank height deviation in Figure 1a where we see the effect of the attacker's constant bias on the control inputs. In Figure 1b , we plot the χ 2 detection statistic for an optimal and an unintelligent design of ΣB where the threshold corresponds with a false alarm rate of 1%. The optimal covariance Σ * B is generated according to the optimization problem in (40) while the unintelligent covariance Σ IID B = δ * I takes an IID structure satisfying the first constraint of (40) according to
where δ is a nonnegative constant. Originally (83) was constructed so that Σ
IID B
would satisfy all the constraints in (40), but this problem proved to be infeasible, implying that the unintelligent covariance is unable to achieve the chosen lower bound on the KL divergence. In (40) and (83), N B = 11
T + 0.5I, while N t = tI in (40). For an attacker who adds a constant bias to the control inputs and subtracts his or her influence from the sensor measurements, a) absolute mean tank height deviations and b) χ 2 detection statistic for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣB As seen in Figure 1b , designing ΣB according to (40) results in the detection of this zero dynamics attack, whereas a nonoptimal design of ΣB results in an undetected attack. Even for very small biases on the optimal control input (0.04 volts), the extended moving target defense with an optimal design of ΣB allows us to detect this integrity attack.
We now consider the design of the covariances ΣĀ and ΣC for the coupling matrices of the quadruple tank process. The optimal time-invariant covariance Σ * B obtained previously is used to generateB k .
We consider the same adversary as previously who does not know the realization ofĀ k orC k but performs his or her attack by sampling these matrices fromĀ k (row i) ∼ N (µĀ, ΣĀ) andC k (row i) ∼ N (µC , ΣC) where we have chosen µĀ = µC = 1. We plot the absolute mean tank height deviation in Figure 2a where we see the effect of the attacker's constant bias on the control inputs. In Figure 2b , we plot the χ 2 detection statistic for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ and ΣC where the threshold corresponds with a false alarm rate of 1%. The optimal covariances Σ * Ā and Σ * C are generated using the optimization problem in (45) while the unintelligent covariances Σ IID A = ξ * 1 I and Σ IID C = ξ * 2 I take IID structures that satisfy all the constraints of (45) according to arg max
where i = 0, · · · , T − 1, ξ 1 and ξ 2 are nonnegative constants, and γ * is the optimal nonnegative constant obtained from (45). In both (45) and (84), the positive semidefinite bounds are set to G A = 11 T + 0.5I, G C = 11 T + 0.5I, and G i = I. As seen in Figure 2b , designing ΣĀ and ΣC according to (45) results in a detection statistic that is significantly greater than that of a non-optimal design for ΣĀ and ΣC . This supports the idea that increasing the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states x A k through the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ a k will result in an increase in detection performance. Even for very small biases on the optimal control input (0.04 volts), the extended moving target defense with optimal designs of ΣĀ and ΣC results in a detection statistic that is far above the threshold. For an attacker who adds a constant bias to the control inputs and subtracts his or her influence from the sensor measurements, a) absolute mean tank height deviations and b) χ 2 detection statistic for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ and ΣC Figure 3 shows the spectral norm of the Fisher information matrix for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ and ΣC . As seen, designing ΣĀ and ΣC according to (45) results in much more information being gained from the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ a k about the attacked states x A k than if a non-optimal design were used. Maximizing this amount of information will help produce a more accurate state estimate regardless of whether or not the system is under attack. 
B. Nonlinear Moving Target Defense
For the nonlinear moving target, we consider nonlinear functions that take the form of an element-wise power function, f (x k ) = x a k , a ∈ Z + . We first investigate how the power of this nonlinear function affects the amount of information an adversary receives about the time-varying matricesĀ k ,B k , andC k through the auxiliary intercepted sensor measurements.
We consider an adversary who starting at time 200 sec. adds a constant input of 0.2 volts to the optimal LQG input and avoids detection by trying to subtract his or her own influence from the sensor measurements as described in (3) . We assume that the attacker does not know the realizations ofĀ k ,B k ,C k , or G k but performs his or her attack by sampling the matrices fromB k (row i) ∼ N (µB, ΣB),Ā k (row i) ∼ N (µĀ, ΣĀ),
where we have chosen µB = 0, µĀ = µC = 1, and µ G = 0.
We plot the absolute mean tank height deviation in Figure  4a for f (x k ) = x 2 k where we see the effect of the attacker's constant bias on the control inputs. In Figure 4b , we plot the spectral norm of the attacker's Fisher information matrix for a few different nonlinear power functions in addition to the case when there is no nonlinear function. For these figures, we use the optimal covariances Σ * B
, Σ * Ā , Σ * C , and Σ * G which are generated according to the optimization problems in (40), (45), and (67). Here the means ofĀ k andC k are used to design the time-invariant ΣB, and the positive semidefinite bounds are set to N B = 11 T + 0.5I, N t = tI, G A = 11 T + 0.5I, G C = 11 T + 0.5I, G i = I, and N = 11 T + 0.5I. As seen in Figure 4b , the presence of the nonlinearity in the auxiliary sensor measurements results in a decrease of information that the adversary receives about the time-varying matricesĀ k ,B k , andC k . Furthermore, we see that nonlinear functions with larger powers (which generally have greater magnitudes) cause the adversary to receive less information about the time-varying matrices, consequently making it more difficult for an adversary to generate stealthy outputs.
We now consider the joint design of the covariances ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G for the coupling matrices and nonlinear coefficient matrix of the quadruple tank process. The optimal timeinvariant covariance Σ * B obtained previously is used to generateB k , and we consider the same adversary as previously.
In Figure 5a , we plot the detection statistic for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G with f (x k ) = x 
where ϕ is a nonnegative constant. Originally (85) was constructed so that Σ IID G would satisfy all the constraints in (67), but this problem proved to be infeasible, implying that the unintelligent covariance is unable to achieve the chosen lower bound on the Fisher information matrix.
As seen in Figure 5a , designing ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G according to (45) and (67) results in a detection statistic that is significantly greater than that of a non-optimal design for ΣĀ, ΣC, and Σ G . This supports the idea that increasing the amount of information the defender receives about the attacked states x A k through the biased auxiliary sensor measurementsỹ a k will result in an increase in detection performance. Even for small biases on the optimal control input (0.2 volts), the nonlinear moving target defense with optimal designs of ΣĀ, ΣC, and Σ G results in a detection statistic that is far greater than the detection statistic under normal operation. For an attacker who adds a constant bias to the control inputs and subtracts his or her influence from the sensor measurements, a) detection statistic for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G and b) spectral norm of the Fisher information matrix for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G Figure 5b shows the spectral norm of the Fisher information matrix for optimal and unintelligent designs of ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G with f (x k ) = x 2 k . As seen, designing ΣĀ, ΣC , and Σ G according to (45) and (67) results in much more information being gained from the biased auxiliary sensor measurements y a k about the attacked states x A k than if a non-optimal design were used. Maximizing this amount of information will help produce a more accurate state estimate regardless of whether or not the system is under attack.
C. Bounds on Attacker's Performance
To investigate lower bounds on the detection statistic when the system is under attack, we consider the extended moving target defense. We consider an adversary who starting at time 200 sec. adds a constant input of 0.3 volts to the optimal LQG input and avoids detection by trying to subtract his or her own influence from the sensor measurements as described in (3) . We assume that the attacker does not know the realizations ofĀ k ,B k , orC k but performs his or her attack by sampling the matrices fromB k (row i) ∼ N (µB, ΣB),Ā k (row i) ∼ N (µĀ, ΣĀ), andC k (row i) ∼ N (µC , ΣC) where we have chosen µB = 0 and µĀ = µC = 1.
We plot the χ 2 detection statistic and its associated lower bound in Figure 6 where we use the optimal covariances Σ * B , Σ * Ā , and Σ * C generated according to the optimization problems in (40) and (45). Here the means ofĀ k andC k are used to design the time-invariant ΣB, and the positive semidefinite bounds are set to N B = 11 T + 0.5I, N t = tI, G A = 11 T + 0.5I, and G C = 11 T + 0.5I. As seen in Figure 6 , the magnitude of the lower bound on the expected value of the detection statistic is much greater than detection thresholds associated with very small false alarm rates, implying that on average, any attack on this extended moving target system will be detected. These results demonstrate that the moving target defense is effective even in worst case attack scenarios. This article presented the moving target defense for detecting and identifying attacks in CPS. The moving target seeks to limit an adversary's knowledge of the model by introducing stochastic time-varying parameters in the control system. We considered the hybrid moving target, the extended moving target, and the nonlinear moving target, analyzing each system and providing guidelines for the design of the system parameters. We demonstrated how the hybrid moving target enables both detection and identification of malicious nodes, presented designs for the extended moving target that maximize detection and estimation performance, and showed how the nonlinear moving target minimizes any information an adversary receives about the time-varying parameters. Lastly, we investigated lower bounds on the detection statistic, showing that the moving target defense is able to detect even the most stealthy attacks. Future work consists of applying the moving target defense to specific use cases, investigating where and how the time-varying parameters might be introduced to take advantage of the existing system dynamics.
